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Dear Participants/Contributors, 
I welcome you all to the 13th ISSEI conference e-proceedings in our Lekythos 
website and I thank you warmly for your participation. Your essays in this 
collection make possible the international and multi-disciplinary vision of the 
ISSEI. As delegates from all over the world, from countries too many to account 
here, and as contributors researching on various fields, topics and persuasions, 
you have, with your presence at the conference and your papers for this electronic 
edition, instantiated an embodied and non-toxic universalism.  
On my part, as editor of the e-proceedings, I am grateful to my colleague Zelia 
Gregoriou for her brilliant organizational ideas and the heavy workload that she 
has undertaken. Special thanks are due to the University of Cyprus Technical 
Services as well as to the Library and Ms Vasiliki Koukounidou and her team who 
have made our Lekythos website a true receptacle of the multicultural and 
multidisciplinary character of the ISSEI. A Lekythos, originally, a decorated 
ceramic vessel used for storing olive oil, evokes the olive branch as a diachronic 
symbol of peace along with the fusion of episteme, utility, art, and the quotidian. 
But Lekythos being at times a part of funerary rites also evokes the interplay of 
eternity and finitude, the unexpectedness of what the future has in store and 
writing as a life operation of keeping thought in store. We hope that such 
connotations of finitude and infinity, and symbolisms of receptivity, irenic academic 
creativity, inconclusiveness of human endeavour and openness to futurity energize 
multiple readings of our Lekythos e-proceedings.      
As co-organizer of the 13th ISSEI, I am grateful to the organization committee 
for their efforts, and especially to Prof Heinz-Uwe Haus whose exceptional and 
indefatigable advice and energy had been a source of constant encouragement 
and inspiration throughout the preparation of the conference. Many thanks also 
to Neophytos Neophytou of the Cyprus Theatre Centre, to Mary Ioannides-
Koutselini, the Head of the Department of Education, for her wholehearted 
commitment to this project, and to my friends and colleagues for their concern, 
participation and ideas.   
I owe special thanks to: Prof Ezra Talmor, Ms Rachel Ben-David, Prof David 
Lovell, Edna and Avital, and all the other members of the ISSEI for their 
guidance and cooperation; as well as to Prof Cem Karadeli, the organizer of the 
previous ISSEI conference at Ankara for his advice and friendly concern. Many 
thanks are due to the team of Easyconferences for their valuable support and 
incomparably efficient problem-solving. The ISSEI and Easyconferences have 
jointly provided the ingredients that make such events realizable: aporia and 
emporia respectively. The perfectionism inherent in the ISSEI vision exposed us 
to an aporia, a daunting wonder, effecting a creative sense of no way and the need 
and desire to think of, and think in, new ways. Easyconferences supplied the 
emporia, the passages, the way toward the approximation of the vision, the 
practical opening of paths for the realization of the ISSEI project. Speaking of 
the ISSEI vision, vivid images of Sasha Talmor come to mind; her friendliness 
and inexhaustible energy had made the ISSEI a memorable experience for many 
of us in the past; and I dedicate this editorial to her memory. The vision of ISSEI 
involves a scientific ethic that can be summed up in the imperative to the thinker, 
the artist and the scientist: “keep going”, “make the humanities endure” and 
“persevere”. As Sascha so pertinently wrote in her article on “aesthetic judgement 
and its criteria of value” (Talmor, 1969), we may have been led to ask questions of 
truth in new ways; but the quandaries of thought and the vision that direct our 
efforts, for instance, when we explore the relation between the ethical and the 
beautiful, still urge us to continue our quest for truth.    
But, what was exactly the 13th ISSEI framework to which you have so kindly and 
richly responded and contributed? In this editorial, I elaborate, briefly and from the 
point of view of philosophy, my field, on the stakes of multidisciplinarity. For, in the 
world of today, art, science and philosophy form a constellation which is suffused 
not only with prospects and creative impetus but also with challenges, tensions and 
ethical dilemmas.    
Marketization exerts enormous pressure on the humanities with detrimental 
effects, while new modes of framing research relativize established patterns of 
academic activity. Such challenges, and many more along these lines, require 
imaginative and bold responses on the part of disciplines, which are now invited not 
just to react or adapt to new global realities but also to intervene in the shaping of 
a world in constant becoming. Yet, apart from the socio-political stakes, art, 
science and philosophy as modalities of thought confront ethical and 
epistemological quandaries that bear upon the relation they have to one another. 
To indicate some of them that implicate philosophy, we may borrow Alain 
Badiou’s connection between dangerous realities and the failures of thought that 
generate such realities.  
For Badiou, ‘every empirical disaster originates in a disaster of thought. […] every 
real and, in particular, every historic disaster contains a philosopheme that knots 
together ecstasy, the sacred and terror’ (1999, p. 131). The glaring 
philosophemes that Badiou singles out comprise Stalinian Marxism´s New 
Proletarian Man, Nazism´s historically destined German people, and the civilized 
man of imperial parliamentary democracies. To them corresponds the ecstasy of 
the place (e.g. the German Land, Socialism´s Homeland, the West) and the 
sacred of the Name (the Führer, the father of peoples, the Marketplace) (ibid, p. 
132). We may employ this discourse to theorize less blatant disasters, some of 
which concern an obsessive and disproportionate encroachment on just one of the 
three narratives at the expense of all others. When art is the case in point, the 
corresponding philosopheme is a sacralised aesthetisization; an assumption that 
art contains a mystical and transcendent quality and an expectation that this 
quality will unleash hidden redemptive and utopian energies. The ecstasy of the 
place of art (the artefact and its locus) along with the sacred of the Name (the 
exceptionalism of the artist) effect a pernicious self-enclosure where the world of 
aesthetic experience displays contempt for the world of the quotidian and its 
facticity.  
But, if aesthetisization presents a risk of exaggerated and hegemonic emphasis on 
art, scientism and positivism are no less dramatic in making the relation among the 
three narratives uneven and lopsided. As Prof Peter Caws (our keynote speaker 
for whose presence at the conference we have been very grateful) has put it, 
“science has suffered from the immodesty of some of its enthusiasts” (2005, p. 
157).  The language of science has been notorious for its presumed ethical 
neutrality, its arrogant self-understanding, and its contempt for the worlds of 
subjective experience, normativity and ideality. The laboratory, science’s locus of 
ecstasy, along with the scientist, who incarnates science’s sacralised name of 
soteriological collective subjectivity, underlie the glorification of the quotidian 
realm of causality, scientific data and facticity.     
For its part, philosophy can also be complicit in the terror of centripetal hegemony. 
The ‘queen of the sciences’ self-declaration has haunted the historical 
relationship of philosophy with the other two narratives (art and science), often 
leading its sacralised Name, the philosopher, to the role of the self-appointed 
prophet and the dogmatic arbiter of all truth. By contrast, philosophy can and 
should serve an interdisciplinarity that respects epistemological boundaries the 
very moment that philosophy struggles to learn from other discourses/disciplines, 
while maintaining a critical stance to their – as well as to philosophy´s own – 
operations. Jürgen Habermas (1990) describes this possibility as a shift of 
philosophy from the position of the usher of sciences to that of the stand-in and 
interpreter of sciences. For Jacques Derrida, when the context is that of inter- or 
multi-disciplinarity, philosophy names both ‘a discipline that belongs to the 
“humanities” and that discipline which claims to think, elaborate and criticize the 
axiomatic of the “humanities”’ (Derrida, 1994, pp. 1-2). And, for Badiou, 
‘scientists, political theorists, artists and psychoanalysts [...] are all of them 
crucially reliant on philosophy when it comes to distinguishing knowledge from 
truth’ (Norris, 2009, p. 11). ‘The pincers of truth, which link and sublimate, have a 
duty to seize truths. The relation of (philosophic) Truth to (scientific, political, 
artistic or amorous) truths is one of seizing’. By “seizing”, Badiou means ‘capture, 
hold, and also seizure, astonishment. Philosophy is the locus of thinking wherein 
(non-philosophic) truths are seized as such, and seize us’ (1999, p. 126). 
However, in reality, unresolved tensions between the language of the humanities 
and the language of empirical sciences as well as the old “Verstehen –Erklären” 
controversy continue unabated – plus contestations of hegemonic space among 
the humanities themselves. Academia often resembles a battlefield, and its 
intellectual warfare seems to be regulated, as I see it, by two opposing but 
complementary pathologies: the one can be termed “stronghold fortification” and 
the other “frame demolition”.  
I define as ‘stronghold fortification’ the kind of obsession with a discipline, 
research idea, framework or project that surfaces when one has given up the quest 
for truth for the sake of strengthening the calibre, resilience and influence of one’s 
discipline or of the given idea, framework or project within one’s discipline. The 
researcher working under the spell of such an obsession looks for, reads, supports, 
prioritizes and disseminates the work/ideas of like-minded people with whom she 
eventually collaborates and creates a subset of scientific communicative 
community. When confronting other disciplines or coming across a new 
idea/project that does not fall easily into (discursive) place, the researcher 
dismisses it as irrelevant to existing debates or as unsure of its direction. Any 
argument within such a context needs to be recognizable in its alliance, or to be 
part of an alliance in the first place. The walls of a position or of an academic field 
are fortified by narrowing the scope of their exposition (and responsiveness) to 
criticisms. A heavily fortified research programme unleashes ‘critical’ energies 
toward whatever seems to constitute its supposed radical other. More generally, 
stronghold fortification energizes an obsessive, onward march of increasingly 
narrow-minded academic circles whose cult becomes manifest in research agendas 
that perpetuate established positions at the expense of whatever seems not to be 
easily accommodated within the received point of view (Papastephanou, 2010). 
Ultimately, the philosopheme underlying stronghold fortification is dogmatism.     
Now, the second pathology, that I have termed ‘frame demolition’, represents an 
eclectic and free-floating merging of discourses and disciplines into new, hybrid 
formations that promise more academic visibility. It satisfies the will for power and 
assists researchers to capitalize on societal praise of what can pass for innovative 
or socially beneficial research and sexy, new discourses. The researcher acts as a 
frame demolisher when she approaches the disciplines that offer her the 
conceptual means relevant to her research question, not so as to learn from them 
and, if needed, to reorient her research, but so as to spot the kind of discourse 
that will advance or justify what she already thinks about the issue. The 
epistemological demands: for more reading and for a deeper understanding of the 
targeted ideas; for respecting the different context within which the ideas operate 
and their resistance to just any kind of adaptability; and for a readiness to move in 
different directions if necessary are all bypassed (ibid). 1The philosopheme 
underlying frame demolishing practices can be described as a sophistic relativism 
and ecclecticism.    
When dogmatism is the outcome of the exaggerations of philosophical self-
understanding the antidote may be the one that Badiou emphasizes, that is, 
sophistiki. As he puts it, ‘the sophist is required at all times for philosophy to 
maintain its ethics. For the sophist is the one who reminds us that the category of 
Truth is void’ (1999, p. 134). Yet, when relativism gains sway, Badiou becomes a 
spirited critic of modern sophistry, which he associates with some postmodern 
practices which display disrespect for epistemic claims and frames of the kind that I 
have described as the frame demolition that is so dominant today. 
We may generalize Badiou’s antidote to cover the cases of hegemonic 
monopolizations of validity and value that pertain to the other narratives too. For 
all, artists, scientists and philosophers, are potentially in danger of absolutizing 
their share of truth and of trying to fortify it, busy as they often are with locating 
and combating adversaries, raising walls against them or including them within the 
walls of their own disciplines. A sophist’s reminder of the inconclusive character of 
truth, yet one that is cautious of its own dangers of sliding down to relativism, might 
be the ethical antidote to centripetal tendencies of all narratives.  
To Badiou, ‘the ethics of philosophy is basically to maintain the sophist as its 
adversary, to preserve polemos [war], dialectical strife. The disastrous moment is 
the one when philosophy declares the sophist must not be, the moment when it 
decrees the annihilation of its Other’ (1999, p. 134). We must constantly be 
reminded, then, that, as Peter Caws puts it, “the operations of the human sciences 
are multiple and particular and distributed, and that all their objects come into and 
are sustained in being by separable and to a degree independent individuals” 
(2005, p. 167). Such individuals identify themselves either as artists or 
philosophers or sophists or scientists, whose “battles over academic turf” or their 
intellectual warfare constitute an ongoing challenge to think in complex ways about 
cognitive endeavour. 
Interdisciplinary endeavours, exchanges and connections across modalities of 
thinking and disciplines should not succumb to stronghold fortification and frame 
demolition. The risk of eventually neutralising cross-disciplinary ventures the very 
moment that we supposedly glorify and celebrate the multiplicity of voices must be 
avoided. In the metaphor evoked by Lekythos as receptacle, rather than being at 
war with one another, disciplines form a unity without closure and without losing 
their uniqueness. Instead of being placed in polemical conflict, instead of 
advancing in battle against one another, intellectual ventures within the irenic 
framework of controversy are stored together, made available to future research 
while attesting to an unknown future. Inter/multi-disciplinarity today heads 
fumblingly toward the dark paths of a world future and of a future world whose 
viability depends much on the light that this scientific/intellectual progression may 
shed on the way and on its own, at times destructive, ways. Through this prism, to 
the question about the 13th ISSEI theme I have responded with a short answer, 
aiming only to introduce the e-proceedings; the long answer has been given by 
your workshops, presentations, discussions, and now by your texts, that is, by your 
gift of thought to all of us, for which we are grateful.2  
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1
 Frame demolishers overlook that not everything can be copied from one context and 
transferred to another without serious consideration of the limits that the attachment to 
context may set. Nor do frame demolishers consider the possibility that the 
epistemological framework of another discipline, rather than being adaptable to your initial 
intentions, it may change your orientation or your way of asking your research questions. 
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